Minority games with finite score memory by Challet, Damien et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
40
75
95
v1
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
dis
-n
n]
  2
2 J
ul 
20
04
Minority games with finite score memory
Damin Challet1, Andrea De Martino 2, Matteo Marsili 3 and Isaac Perez Castillo4
1Nomura Centre for Quantitative Finance, Mathematical Institute,
Oxford University, 24–29 St Giles’, Oxford OX1 3LB, United Kingdom
2INFM-SMC and Dipartimento di Fisica, Universita` di Roma “La Sapienza”, P.le A. Moro 2, 00185 Roma, Italy
3The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Strada Costiera 11, 34100 Trieste, Italy
4Instituut voor Theoretische Fysica, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, B-3001 Leuven, Belgium
We analyze grand-canonical minority games with infinite and finite score memory and different
updating timescales (from ‘on-line’ games to ‘batch’ games) in detail with various complementary
methods, both analytical and numerical. We focus on the emergence of ‘stylized facts’ and on the
production of exploitable information, as well as on the dynamic behaviour of the models. We find
that with finite score memory no agent can be frozen, and that all the current analytical methods
fail to provide satisfactory explanation of the observed behaviours.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few realistic agent-based models of financial markets
can be understood in depth. Among these, minority
games (MGs) [1, 2] are perhaps the most studied at a fun-
damental physical level, especially through a systematic
use of spin-glass techniques [3–7]. The inclusion of many
important aspects of market dynamics in the standard
MG setup, however, often leads to considerable technical
difficulties and raises new challenges for statistical me-
chanics. A particularly important modification concerns
the memory of agents. In the original game, the learning
dynamics on which traders base their strategic decisions
is such that they remember all their past payoffs irre-
spective of how far in time they occurred. It is however
reasonable to think that real traders tend to base their
choices only on the most recent events. This rather natu-
ral extension was originally introduced in [8] for a model
in which agents play the MG strategically. For the pur-
pose of modeling financial markets, the relevant situation
is instead that of price-taking, or na¨ıve, agents. In this
case, it has been argued that finite score memory gives
rise to a surprisingly rich dynamical phenomenology [9].
In this paper, we will analyze such models in detail.
There are of course several ways to introduce a finite
memory in the MG. A conceptually simple one is to fix
a time window M (the ‘score memory’) during which
agents keep exact track of their scores [10, 11]. The main
advantage is that the game becomes Markovian of order
M . This situation can be handled numerically for reason-
ably smallM . Here, we are interested in the case in which
M is of the order of the number of traders N , which is
supposed to be very large (ultimately, the limit N →∞
will be considered). For the sake of simplicity, we choose
to implement the situation in which scores are exponen-
tially damped in time, which requires only a minor mod-
ification of the original equations. Furthermore, we shall
focus on the grand-canonical MG (GCMG) [12], which
is known to produce market-like fluctuation phenomena
and whose properties have been shown to be extremely
sensitive to the introduction of a finite memory [9]. Both
the ‘on-line’ and ‘batch’ versions of the model will be
addressed. The two situations differ by the timescales
over which agents update their status: in the former, the
updating takes place at every time step; in the latter, it
occurs roughly once every P time steps, with P = O(N).
In particular, following [13], we use a parameter that in-
terpolates between the ‘on-line’ and ‘batch’ models and
study how the resulting fluctuation phenomena are af-
fected by changes of updating timescales.
We shall proceed by defining the models (Sec. II) and
exploring, via computer experiments, their behaviour
(Sec. III). We will focus especially on the emergence and
parameter-dependence of ‘stylized facts’, peculiar statis-
tical regularities that are empirically observed in financial
markets. In Sections IV and V we will characterize ana-
lytically the stationary states of the model with infinite
and finite memory, respectively. We use static replica-
based minimization techniques in order to compute the
properties of the on-line game with infinite score mem-
ory. For the batch game, one can resort to dynamical
mean-field theory. The resulting theory is exactly solv-
able in the case of infinite memory. For finite-memory
games, we have to resort a Monte Carlo scheme, known
as Eissfeller-Opper method [14], to extract the steady
state from the dynamical mean-field equations. Finally,
we formulate our concluding remarks in Sec. VI. For the
sake of completeness, we add an Appendix in which the
effects of finite score memory in the standard MG are
discussed.
II. DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
In a minority game, at each time step t, N traders
are faced with two choices: to buy or to sell; those
who happen to be in the minority win. The game is
repeated, and the traders’ actions are determined by a
simple re-inforcement learning. Each agent i has his own
fixed trading strategy ai = {aµi } that specifies an ac-
tion aµi ∈ {−1, 1} for each of the µ = 1, . . . , P states
of the world. Each component of every strategy is ran-
2domly drawn from {−1, 1} with uniform probability be-
fore the beginning of the game. The adaptation abilities
of agent i are limited to choosing whether to participate
or to withdraw from the market, denoted respectively by
ni(t) = 1 and ni(t) = 0. At time t, the state of the world
µ(t) is drawn equiprobably from {1, . . . , P}. Agent i sets
his ni(t) according to the sign of his strategy score, de-
noted by Ui(t). In particular, he plays ni(t)a
µ(t)
i where
ni(t) = Θ[Ui(t)] and Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function.
The total excess demand A(t) at time t, namely the nu-
merical difference between buyers and sellers, is
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ni(t)a
µ(t)
i . (1)
All the agents then update their score according to
yi(t+ 1) =
(
1− λi
P
)
yi(t)− 1
P
a
µ(t)
i A(t)−
ǫi
P
(2)
with λi ≥ 0 a constant. The (1 − λi/P ) term is re-
sponsible for finite score memory: if λi = 0, the agent
has infinite score memory, as usually assumed in MGs,
while for λi > 0 he has an exponentially damped mem-
ory of his past scores. More precisely, the number of time
steps needed to forget a fraction fi of his/her payoff is
ln(1− fi)/ ln(1− λi/P ); for λi/P ≪ 1, it is proportional
to P/λi. The payoff − aµ(t)i A(t) is that of a Minority
Game. The last term ǫi sets a benchmark that agent i
has to beat in order to participate in the market. For in-
stance, ǫi can be thought of as the interest of a risk-free
account (see [12, 15] for more details).
Although our analysis can be extended easily to a more
heterogeneous case, we assume, for the sake of simplic-
ity, that λi = λ and that there are two groups of agents:
those with ǫi = −∞, referred to as ‘producers’, who al-
ways take part in the market, and the rest, who have
ǫi = ǫ finite and are called ‘speculators’ [16]. Traders
with ǫ > 0 (resp. ǫ < 0) are risk-averse (resp. risk-
prone), i.e., they have an incentive to stay out of (resp.
enter) the market. We denote by Ns and Np the num-
ber of speculators and producers, respectively. The pro-
ducers, being deterministic, inject information into the
market, that the speculators try to exploit. This setup,
which defines an ecology of market participants, has been
introduced in [15] as the simplest tractable interacting
agents model able to reproduce the ‘stylized facts’ of fi-
nancial markets [12]. In the statistical mechanics ap-
proach, one is interested in the limit of large systems,
in which P,Ns, Np → ∞ keeping the reduced number
of agents ns = limP→∞Ns/P and np = limP→∞Np/P
fixed.
Up to now, agents update their variables ni(t) at each
time step. It is natural in financial markets to assume
that traders prefer not to change their strategy every
time step in order to avoid over-reacting, and also be-
cause estimating the performance of a strategy needs
some time. This can be approximated in our model by
allowing agents to change their variable ni every T time
steps [13]. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
agents perform the updates synchronously. If T ≫ P ,
the score update between t and t + T is essentially an
average of score increases over all the states of the world.
In this limit, defining t′ as t/T , one can rewrite (2) as
yi(t
′ + 1) = (1− λi)yi(t′)−
N∑
j=1
Jijnj(t
′)− αǫi (3)
with α = P/N = (ns + np)
−1 and quenched random
couplings Jij given by
Jij =
1
N
P∑
µ=1
aµi a
µ
j (4)
Because this dynamics is equivalent to enumerating all
µ ∈ {1, . . . , P}, we assumed that all the states of the
world always occur between t′ and t′ + 1. The neural
network literature refers to models with T = 1 as ‘on-
line’, whereas models such as (3) are called ‘batch’. The
parameter T allows the interpolation between the former
and the latter.
Batch minority games were introduced in [17] and
solved later exactly with generating functionals [5], an ex-
act dynamical method. The stationary states of (2) and
(3) are, strictly speaking, different even in the thermody-
namic limit. This is because agents in batch games have a
longer auto-correlation: for instance, denoting φi = 〈ni〉
the time average of ni(t) in the stationary state, one has
〈ninj〉 = φiφj in on-line games [3, 7], but not in batch
games [7].
III. STYLIZED FACTS
The connection between minority game’s outcome A
and real prices comes from relating A to the ‘excess de-
mand’, and linking the evolution of the price p(t) to it
via
log p(t+ 1) = log p(t) +
A(t)
L
(5)
where L is a constant, the ‘liquidity’, that will be here-
after fixed to 1 [18, 19]. While the original MG revealed
insightful relationships between price fluctuations and
predictability, it fails to reproduce the empirically ob-
served market-like behaviour, in particular the so-called
‘stylized facts’. As a consequence, GCMGs were intro-
duced to better mimic market dynamics. They are able
to produce stylized facts such as fat-tailed price return
distributions P (A) ∝ A−β with β ≃ 3.5 and volatility
clustering 〈A(t)2A(t+ τ)2〉 ∝ τ−γ with γ ≃ 0.3; these
exponents are close to those measured in real markets.
They are however unable to reproduce well documented
over-diffusive price behavior [20, 21], because the MG
induces a mean-reverting process.
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FIG. 1: Return as a function of time for the same realisation
of a GCMG with biased initial strategy scores and λ = 0
(black lines), and λ = 0.003 (red lines). System set in the
critical window, P = 25, ns = 40, ǫ = 0.01
The presence of stylized facts in the GCMG with λ = 0
was linked to a too small signal-to-noise ratio, suggesting
that marginal efficiency is a necessary condition for the
existence of stylized facts [12]. In other words, in infinite
systems, stylized facts only occur at a the phase transi-
tion, whereas in finite systems, critical-like phenomenol-
ogy is observed in a critical window around the critical
point, which shrinks as the system size increases (see [12]
for more details and for a way of keeping alive stylized
facts in infinite systems). Therefore, the stylized facts of
this model cannot be studied by the methods of statisti-
cal mechanics.
While the ability of the GCMG to produce stylized
facts was emphasised in previous work, Ref. [9] pointed
out two delicate problems of GCMG regarding stylized
facts. The first one is the dependence of stylized facts
on initial conditions: assume that one given realization
of the game produces stylized facts; changing slightly the
initial conditions yi(0) is then enough to destroy them,
leading to scenarios with only Gaussian price changes.
The second problem is the following: for a given set of
parameters, one realization of the game may produce
stylized facts but another not. Both problems are due
to the coincidence of fixed disorder in the strategies and
infinite score keeping. This ultimately motivates the in-
troduction of finite score memory. Fig. 1 compares A(t)
for the same game with yi(0) 6= 0, once with λ = 0 and
once with λ > 0. In the latter case, fluctuations have a
characteristic pattern as a function of time: they first de-
crease to a very small value, stay at this level for a time
interval of order 1/λ and then increase, producing fat-
tailed price returns. The same kind of volatility behavior
occurs in the original MG (see Appendix A).
However, finite score memory is a double-edged sword.
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FIG. 2: Absolute-valued price return auto-correlation func-
tion for increasing λ for a given realisation of an on-line game;
inset: same data in double-linear scale (107 iterations per run,
after 200P iterations; P = 20, ns = 20, np = 1, ǫ = 0.01)
First of all, certain empirical stylized facts, in particu-
lar ‘volatility clustering’, suggest the presence of long-
memory effects in markets. If one defines volatility clus-
tering via the requirement
C(τ) ≡ 〈|A(t)||A(t + τ)|〉〈A(t)2〉 ≃ τ
−γ (6)
it is easily understood that any positive value of λ de-
stroys this power-law dependence, because of the cut-off
that it imposes at times of the order of P/| ln(1−λ)|. Fig.
2, by displaying C(τ) for τ ≤ 1000, is not able to show
this effect for λ < 0.001; the cut-off is clear for larger λ.
Not only C(τ) is cut off, but the loss of memory induces
a negative C(τ) at large τ (see inset).
The other potentially nefarious effect of finite score
memory is threaten the power-law tails: GCMGs pro-
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FIG. 3: Average price return distribution function of on-line
games for increasing λ. Average of 100 samples on 106 itera-
tions per run, after 200P iterations; P = 20, ns = 20, np = 1,
ǫ = 0.01.
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FIG. 4: Average price return distribution function of on-line
games for increasing λ. Average of 100 samples on 106 itera-
tions per run, after 200P iterations; P = 20, ns = 40, np = 1,
ǫ = 0.01.
duce power-law tailed A because of a volatility feed-back
[12]. This feed-back needs some time to establish, hence
if the memory length associated to λ is smaller than this
time, power-law tails should disappear. This is indeed
the case (see Figs 3 and 4), in a queer way: the central
part of P (A) is exponential, but the size of the support
of P (A) actually increases because of the appearance of
two peaks. Note that maximum value λ∗ of λ for which
stylized facts are preserved depends on the system’s pa-
rameter, as shown by these two figures.
We conclude that, in practice, a sufficiently small
λ ≥ λ∗ ≃ 0.001 preserves the salient stylized facts: the
noise of C(τ) for τ ≥ 100 in GCMG or in financial market
data is such that the values of λ that preserve power-law
tails of P (A) do so for C(1). Therefore, the introduction
of finite score memory does not affect significantly the
market-like phenomenology produced by GCMG. The
value of λ∗ obtained has to be contrasted with the small
typical time-window used e.g. in [10, 11].
Let us now investigate the effect of updating the ni(t)
every T time steps (see Fig. 5). Increasing T , one inter-
polates between on-line games (T = 1) and batch games
(T ≫ P ). One clearly sees that this destroys large price
changes: while P (A) has power-law tails when T = 1, it
is gradually transformed into an exponential distribution
for T ≫ P . This is because large price changes is associ-
ated to a given pattern µ [9, 11] that varies as a function
of time, as illustrated by Fig. 6. However, it should be
noted that T ≃ P gives rise to a cleaner power-law.
Batch games display the same kind of transition when
λ is increased. Fig. 7 shows that the largest value of λ
such that Pλ(A) ≃ P0(A) is smaller and around 0.002 for
ns = 20, P = 20. Interestingly, the distribution of price
changes P (A) is more or less stable with respect to λ as
long as λ < 0.004 in this figure. This is an important
condition for the use of finite memory in these models.
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FIG. 5: Average price return distribution function for increas-
ing T . Average of 100 samples on 1,000,000 iterations per run,
after 200P iterations; P = 20, ns = 40, np = 1, ǫ = 0.01.
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FIG. 6: Price return as a function of time for various patterns
µ. A symbol is plotted only when µ(t) = µ.
IV. STATIONARY STATE WITH λ = 0
This section characterizes the steady state of both the
on-line (Eq. (2)) and batch GCMG (Eq. (3)) for λ = 0.
The relevant macroscopic observables are as usual the
‘volatility’ σ2 and the ‘predictability’ H , given respec-
tively by
σ2 =
〈A2〉
P
H =
〈A|µ〉2
P
(7)
where 〈· · ·〉 and 〈· · · |µ〉 denote time averages in the sta-
tionary state, the latter conditioned on the occurrence
of the piece of information µ, and the over-line denotes
an average over information patterns. In on-line games,
these two quantites are linked by
σ2 = H + φ−G (8)
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FIG. 7: Average price return distribution function of batch
games for increasing λ. Average of 100 samples on 1,000,000
batch iterations per run, after 200P batch iterations; P = 20,
ns = 20, np = 1, ǫ = 0.01.
where G =
∑Ns
i=1 φ
2
i /P , φi = 〈ni〉 denoting the probabil-
ity that speculator i joins the market in the steady state.
The normalizing P factors have been introduced in or-
der to ensure that all quantities remain finite when P ,
Ns, Np → ∞. In addition to these, an important role is
played by the relative number of active speculators
φ =
1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
φi (9)
as well as by the number of active speculators per pat-
tern, i.e. nact = nsφ.
A. On-line GCMG: static approach
Partial results from replica-based calculus are reported
in Ref. [12], and are based on the existence of a global
quantity Hǫ that is minimized by the dynamics. Finding
Hǫ relies on the prescription given in Ref. [22]: first
derive the continuous-time stochastic differential version
of Eq. (2), which reads
y˙i(τ) = −ai〈niA〉 − ǫ+ ηi(τ) (10)
where τ = t/P is the intrisic time of the GCMG, ηi(t)
is a zero-average Gaussian noise with 〈ηi(τ)ηj(τ ′)〉 =
1
N aiaj〈A2〉yδ(τ−τ ′), and the over-line denotes an average
over information patterns: · · · = (1/P )∑Pµ=1 · · · . The
deterministic term of this equation can be interpreted
as the gradient of Hǫ, so that Hǫ = H0 + 2ǫ
∑Ns
i=1 φi.
Stationary states correspond then to the minima of Hǫ.
When the stationary state is unique, its equilibrium prop-
erties are entirely determined by Hǫ; otherwise, one has
to supplementHǫ with a self-consistent equation for com-
puting correlations [22]. RegardingHǫ as a cost function,
one may compute the minima of Hǫ from the partition
function Z(β) = Tr e−βHǫ . The typical properties of
the minimum of Hǫ, i.e. of the β → ∞ limit of free en-
ergy, require the evaluation of the quenched-disorder av-
erage [logZ]dis, which is performed via the replica trick
[logZ]dis = limn→0 log [〈Zn〉]dis /n.
Reference [12] reported plots of the exact solution.
Here we give the final results of the calculus only, as
the latter is standard (see however [16] for more de-
tails). With replica symmetric ansatz, the free energy
f = (1/β∂) lnZ/∂β, which corresponds to Hǫ in the limit
β →∞, is given by
f(g, r) =
α
2β
log
[
1 +
2β(G− g)
α
]
+
ρ+ g
1 + χ
+
αβ
2
(RG− rg)− 1
β
〈
log
∫ 1
0
dπ e−βVz(π)
〉
(11)
where we found it convenient to define the “potential”
Vz(π) = −αβ(R− r)
2
π2 −√αr z π + 2ǫπ (12)
so that the last term of f looks like the free energy of a
particle in the interval [0, 1] with potential Vz(π) where z
plays the role of disorder. G =
∑Ns
i=1 φ
2
i is the self-overlap
and g, R, r are Lagrange multipliers.
The four saddle point equations have exactly the same
form as MG without the 0 strategy:
∂f
∂g
= 0 ⇒ r = 4(ρ+ g)
α2(1 + χ)2
(13)
∂f
∂G
= 0 ⇒ β(R− r) = − 2
α(1 + χ)
(14)
∂f
∂R
= 0 ⇒ G = 〈〈π2〉π〉z (15)
∂f
∂r
= 0 ⇒ β(G− g) = 〈〈πz〉π〉z√
αr
(16)
In the limit β → 0 we can look for a solution with
g → G and r → R. It is convenient to define
χ =
2β(G− g)
α
, and ζ = −
√
α
r
β(R − r) (17)
and to require that they stay finite in the limit β → ∞.
The potential can then be rewritten as
Vz(π) =
√
αr
[
ζ
π2
2
− π
(
z − 2ǫ√
αr
)]
(18)
The averages are easily evaluated since, in this case,
they are dominated by the minimum of the potential
Vz(π). Let K be ǫ(1 + χ), the minimum of Vz(π) is at
π = 0 for z ≤ ζ K and at π = +1 for z ≥ ζ(1 +K). For
ζ K < z < ζ[1 + K], the minimum is at π = z/ζ − K.
With this we find,
〈〈πz〉〉 = 1
2ζ
{
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
}
(19)
6and
〈〈π2〉〉 = G = 1
ζ
√
2π
[
(K − 1)e−(1+K)2ζ2/2 −Ke−K2z2/2
]
+
1
2
(
K2 +
1
ζ2
)(
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
)
+
1
2
erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2] (20)
The fraction of agents who never enter into the market
is then φ0 = (1+erf(ζK/
√
2)/2, and the ones who always
participate is φ1 = erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]/2. The pdf of the
πi is given by
P(π) = φ0δ(π) + φ1δ(π − 1) + ζ√
2π
e−(ζ(π+K))
2/2 (21)
And the average number of agents in the market φ = 〈π〉
where the average is over P(π), is
φ = φ1 +
1
ζ
√
2π
(
e−K
2ζ2/2 − e−ζ2(1+K)2/2
)
+
K
2
(erf(Kζ/
√
2)− erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2])
Observing that ζ =
√
α/(ρ+G), one finally finds that ζ
is fixed as a function of α and ρ by the equation
α
ζ2
= ρ+
1
ζ
√
2π
[
(K − 1)e−(1+K)2ζ2/2 −Ke−K2z2/2
]
+
1
2
(
K2 +
1
ζ2
)(
erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2− erf(Kζ/
√
2)
)
+
1
2
erfc[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2] (22)
which has to be solved numerically. With some more
algebra, one easily finds :
K = ǫ
[
1− erf[(1 +K)ζ/
√
2]− erf(Kζ/√2)
2α
]−1
(23)
These two last equations form a close non-linear set of
equations.
The calculus gives finally Hǫ = limβ→∞f
Hǫ =
np + nsG(ζ,K)
(1 + χ)2
+ 2ǫφ(K, ζ) (24)
The stationary is unique if Hǫ 6= 0, which is the case
as long as ǫ 6= 0 and for ns ≤ n∗s(np, ǫ) if ǫ = 0.
The fluctuations are given by
σ2 = ǫ2
np + nsG
K2
+ ns(φ−G). (25)
One can also show that Hǫ ∝ ǫ2 for small ǫ: according
to Eq. (24), this hold if K → 0 < K0 < ∞, which can
be seen by expanding Eq. (23) in powers of ǫ.
B. Batch GCMG: dynamical approach
We consider the batch-GCMG dynamics, which we re-
cast as
yi(t+ 1) = yi(t)−
N∑
j=1
Jijnj(t)− αǫi + hi(t) (26)
with
ǫi =
{
ǫ for 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns
−∞ for Ns + 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns +Np ≡ N
The subscripts s and p denote speculators and producers,
respectively. The relevant dynamical variable is ni(t) =
Θ[yi(t)] (for producers, ni(t) = 1), while the random
couplings Jij are given by (4), Jij = (1/N)
∑
µ a
µ
i a
µ
j ,
with aµi ∈ {−1, 1} iid quenched random variables with
uniform probability distribution. For simplicity, we set
α =
P
N
=
1
ns + np
(27)
with ns = Ns/P and np = Np/P . The external sources
hi(t) have been added in order to probe the system
against small perturbations. In the following, we denote
averages over all possible time-evolutions (paths), i.e. re-
alizations of (26), by double brackets 〈〈· · ·〉〉.
The standard tool for investigating the dynamics of
statistical systems with quenched disorder is the path-
integral method a` la De Dominicis, based on the evalua-
tion of the generating functional
Z[ψ] =
〈〈exp
−i∑
i,t
ni(t)ψi(t)
〉〉
dis
(28)
from which disorder-averaged site-dependent correlation
functions of all orders can be derived via such identities
as
[〈〈ni(t)〉〉]dis = i lim
ψ→0
∂Z[ψ]
∂ψi(t)
(29)
[〈〈ni(t)nj(t′)〉〉]dis = − limψ→0
∂2Z[ψ]
∂ψi(t)∂ψj(t′)
(30)
In turn, macroscopic (auto)-correlation and response
functions like
C(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
[〈〈ni(t)ni(t′)〉〉]dis (31)
G(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂ [〈〈ni(t)〉〉]dis
∂hi(t′)
(32)
can in principle be evaluated by simply taking derivatives
of Z with respect to the sources {ψi, hi}. The calculation
of Z in the limit N → ∞ leads, via a saddle-point inte-
gration, to the identification of a non-Markovian single
7(‘effective’) agent process that provides a complete de-
scription of the original Markovian multi-agent process
(26). This procedure requires a straightforward varia-
tion of the cases dealt with in the existing literature and
we will not report it in detail. For our purposes, it will
suffice to say that the effective dynamics for speculators
is given by
y(t+ 1) = y(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
(I +G)−1(t, t′)n(t′)
− αǫ+ h(t) +√αz(t) (33)
with n(t) = Θ[y(t)], whereas n(t) = 1 for producers al-
ways. Here, I is the identity matrix, G is the response
function (32), and z(t) is a Gaussian noise with zero av-
erage and time correlations
〈z(t)z(t′)〉 = [(I +G)−1C(I +GT )−1](t, t′) (34)
with C the correlation function (31). Notice that the
coupling between the two groups is provided in essence
by the noise term, since both speculators and producers
contribute to C. In fact, the correlation function can be
written as
C(t, t′) = nsαCs(t, t′) + npα (35)
where nsα (resp. npα) is the fraction of speculators (resp.
producers), and Cs (resp. Cp) denote the correlation
function of speculators (resp. producers). For the re-
sponse function we have, similarly,
G(t, t′) = nsαGs(t, t′) + npαGp(t, t′)
= nsαGs(t, t
′) (36)
producers being ‘frozen’ at n = 1 and thus insensitive to
small perturbations.
Assuming time-translation invariance,
lim
t→∞
C(t+ τ, t) = C(τ) (37)
lim
t→∞
G(t+ τ, t) = G(τ) (38)
finite integrated response,
lim
t→∞
∑
t′≤t
G(t, t′) <∞ (39)
and weak long-term memory,
lim
t→∞
G(t, t′) = 0 ∀t′ finite (40)
ergodic steady states of (33) can be characterized in
terms of a couple of order parameters, namely the per-
sistent autocorrelation
c = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t<τ
C(τ) (41)
and the integrated response (or susceptibility)
χ = lim
τ→∞
∑
t<τ
G(τ) (42)
From (35) and (36) we get
c = nsαcs + npα (43)
χ = nsαχs (44)
where cs and χs are the persistent autocorrelation and
susceptibility of speculators. For λ = 0 one can formu-
late, inspired by computer experiments, a simple Ansatz
for the dynamics of scores that allows to calculate these
quantities exactly as functions of c and χ, so that from
(43) and (44) one may retrieve the values of the persis-
tent order parameters for any ns and np. In this case,
ergodicity breaks down as χ diverges at certain critical
values of the parameters, thus violating (39). This analy-
sis, including the dynamical phase transition, reproduces
the phenomenology of the batch-GCMGwithout memory
remarkably well, at least in the ergodic regime.
The score y(t) of speculators either grows linearly with
time as y(t) ≃ v t (in which case the agent is ‘frozen’
at inactivity with n(t) = 0 if v < 0 or activity with
n(t) = 1 if v > 0), or keeps oscillating about y(t) =
0 (in which case the agent is ‘fickle’) [23]. In order to
distinguish between the two situations, we introduce the
variable y˜(t) = y(t)/t. Using this, we can sum (33) over
time to obtain
y˜(t+ 1)− 1
t
y(1) = −α
t
∑
t′,t′′
(I +G)−1(t′, t′′)n(t′′)
− αǫ+
√
α
t
∑
t′
z(t′) (45)
where n(t) = Θ[y˜(t)]. In the limit t → ∞, the above
leads, via (37–40), to a simple equation for the quantity
y˜ = limt→∞ y˜(t):
y˜ = − αn
1 + χ
− αǫ+√αz (46)
where χ is given by (42), n = limτ→∞(1/τ)
∑
t≤τ n(t),
and z = limτ→∞(1/τ)
∑
t≤τ z(t) is a zero-average Gaus-
sian rv with variance
〈z2〉 = 1
ττ ′
∑
t≤τ,t′≤τ ′
〈z(t)z(t′)〉 = c
(1 + χ)2
(47)
Defining γ =
√
α/(1 + χ), we can proceed as usual
by separating the frozen speculators from the fickle ones.
We have the following situation: for y˜ > 0 the effective
speculator is always active (n = 1) and z > γ +
√
αǫ; for
y˜ < 0 the effective speculator is always inactive (n = 0)
and z <
√
αǫ; for y˜ = 0 the effective speculator is fickle,
n = z−
√
αǫ
γ and
√
αǫ < z < γ +
√
αǫ. So we have
cs = 〈Θ(z − γ −
√
αǫ)〉
+ 〈Θ(z −√αǫ)Θ(γ +√αǫ− z)
(
z −√αǫ
γ
)2
〉 (48)
8with brackets denoting an average over z. For χs, we use
the fact that the noise z(t) formally acts like an external
source in (46), so that χs = (1/
√
α)〈∂n∂z 〉. This gives
χs =
1
γ
√
α
〈Θ(z −√αǫ)Θ(γ +√αǫ − z)〉 (49)
One can also calculate the average activity level of spec-
ulators as
φ ≡ 〈n〉 = 〈Θ(z − γ −√αǫ)〉+
〈Θ(z −√αǫ)Θ(γ +√αǫ− z)(z −
√
αǫ
γ
)〉 (50)
from which the number of active speculators per pattern
follows as nact = nsφ, and the fraction of frozen specula-
tors as
f = 〈Θ(z − γ −√αǫ)〉+ 〈Θ(αǫ − z)〉 = f1 + f0 (51)
where f1 (resp. f0) stands for the fraction of always
active (resp. inactive) speculators. Inserting (48) and
(49) into (43) and (44) one obtains two equations that can
be solved self-consistently for c and χ. These equations
can be analyzed for any ǫ. For the sake of simplicity, we
focus on the case ǫ = 0, in which the averages over z take
a particularly simple form. We have
c = npα+ nsα
[
1
2
(
1− erf
√
α
2c
)
+
c
2α
erf
√
α
2c
− e− α2c
√
c
2πα
]
(52)
χ
1 + χ
=
ns
2
erf
√
α
2c
(53)
whereas φ reads
φ =
1
2
(
1− erf
√
α
2c
)
+
√
c
2πα
(1− e− α2c ) (54)
As a quick consistency check, one can see, starting
from (53) and with minor manipulations, that a diver-
gence of the susceptibility (i.e. the violation of (39)
with consequent ergodicity breaking) for np = 1 oc-
curs at ns = n
∗
s = 2/erf(ξ
∗) where ξ∗ is the solution
of the transcendental equation e−ξ
2
= ξ
√
π. The result,
n∗s = 4.14542 . . ., is in full agreement with the replica
results of both the on-line and the batch-model.
In order to compare with the computer experiments
discussed above, we analyze the fraction of active spec-
ulators and the volatility σ2 obtained from (52–53) at
np = 1. As said above, the former is just nact = nsφ. As
for the latter, it is formally given by
σ2 = lim
t→∞
〈z(t)z(t)〉/α (55)
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FIG. 8: GCMG with λ = 0: number of active speculators per
pattern nact = nsφ (top) and volatility (bottom) at np = 1
as a function of ns for different values of ǫ. The dashed ver-
tical line marks the position of the critical point n∗s . Markers
denote results from computer experiments.
It is possible to derive an approximate expression for the
above limit in terms of persistent order parameters as-
suming that the retarded self-interaction of fickle spec-
ulators is negligible, that is, by neglecting the agent’s
auto-correlation. This leads to [5]
ασ2 =
np + nsf1
(1 + χ)2
+
1
4
ns(1 − f). (56)
Comparing with the replica result, one sees that σ2 com-
prises a H0 term, as expected from the relationship (25).
However, the other terms differ, as in the standard MG.
In Fig. 8 we report the behavior of φ and σ2 obtained
from (52–53) at np = 1. Dynamical results for the
batch model are in excellent agreement with the simu-
lations of the batch-GCMG and reproduce qualitatively
the phenomenology of the on-line-GCMG. For the sake
of completeness, we also report (see Fig. 9), for ǫ = 0,
the critical line n∗s(np) where χ diverges and ergodicity
breaks down. After some algebra, it turns out to be given
0 5 10 15
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FIG. 9: GCMG with λ = 0: critical line n∗s vs np, where
χ diverges and (39) is violated at ǫ = 0. The dynamics is
ergodic for n < n∗s .
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FIG. 10: φ1 and φ0 as a function of time for games with λ = 0
(black lines), 0.01 (red lines) and 0.1 (green lines). P = 100,
ns = 4, ǫ = 0.05
by n∗s(np) = 2/erf(ξ
∗), where ξ∗ ≡ ξ∗(np) is the solution
of
e−ξ
2
ξ
√
π
= (np − 1)erf(ξ) + 1 (57)
V. STATIONARY STATE WITH λ > 0
One may expect that the stationary state of Minority
Games with λ > 0 depends smoothly on λ in ergodic
regions, and indeed some important quantities such as
the fluctuations and H do behave this way. More sur-
prising is the vanishing of frozen agents: Fig. 10 reports
that both φ0 and φ1 seem to cancel for any positive λ,
although this may not appear for finite-time simulations
at small values of λ; the measure was done from t = 1000
and counts the fraction of agents that are never out of
the market and in the market, respectively.
A. On-line GCMG: static approach
In many versions of the minority game with infinite
score memory (λ = 0) and na¨ıve agents, a phase tran-
sition takes place. H behaves like a physical order pa-
rameter which is minimized by the dynamics. The latter
is ergodic as long as H > 0. However, when H = 0,
the stationary state is note unique, and the dynamics
becomes non-ergodic: the stationary state is selected by
the initial score valuation yi(0); this happens in partic-
ular in the original MG and in the present GCMG with
ǫ = 0 and λ = 0. On the other hand, it is obvious that
if yi(0) is gradually forgotten, the stationary state can-
not depend anymore on Ui(0). This is precisely what
the introduction of the finite score memory does: when
λ > 0, the dynamics is ergodic, and accordingly the sta-
tionary state is unique. This would be compatible with
a minimized quantity that is not cancelled anymore by
the dynamics; intuitively, this means that a new term is
added to Hǫ. Unfortunately, finding such function turns
out to be impossible in this case, which rules out the use
of replica-based approach.
B. Batch GCMG: dynamical approach
Let us now turn to the effective process (33) with finite
score memory. As discussed above, in this case scores do
not diverge with time, i.e. limt→∞ y(t) <∞, and it is no
longer possible to separate frozen agents from fickle ones
by the use of the quantity y˜ = limt→∞ y(t)/t. Indeed,
proceeding as done for the case λ = 0, one obtains, in
place of (46), the condition
λ lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
t′≤t
y(t′) = − αφ
1 + χ
− αǫ+√αz (58)
where the term on the l.h.s. is finite. In addition, the fact
that the fraction of frozen players undergoes an extremely
slow dynamics ultimately suggesting that all agents are
fickle in the stationary state indicates the necessity of a
different analytical approach when λ 6= 0. Unfortunately,
have been unable to capture the peculiarities of the score
dynamics with a simple Ansatz.
Some general hints can be obtained by calculating ex-
plicitly the first time step of (33). For simplicity, we
henceforth adopt the shorthand 〈z(t)z(t′)〉 = L(t, t′) for
(34). Furthermore, we assume an initial condition y(0)
for (33) ensuring that all speculators are active at time
0, so that C(0, 0) = 1 and (by causality) G(0, 0) = 0 and
L(0, 0) = 1. The transition probability to pass from y(0)
to y(1) is given by
p[y(1)|y(0)] = 1√
α
e−
1
2α
[y(1)−(1−λ)y(0)−Θ(0)+αn(0)+αǫ]2
(59)
As a consequence, we have
C(1, 0) =
∫
dy(1)dy(0)p[y(1)|y(0)]p(y(0))n(1)n(0)
=
1
2
[
1− erf
(
αn(0) + αǫ− h(0)− (1 − λ)y(0)√
2α
)]
=
1
2
[
1− erf
(
α+ αǫ − (1− λ)y(0)√
2α
)]
(60)
where we set h(0) = 0 and used the fact that n(0) = 1,
and
G(1, 0) =
∂
∂h(0)
∫
dy(1)dy(0)p[y(1)|y(0)]p(y(0))n(1)
=
1√
2πα
exp
{
− 1
2α
[α+ αǫ− (1− λ)y(0)]2
}
(61)
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From these, we can evaluate (recalling that in the steady
state (55) holds) the time-dependent volatilities
L(1, 0) =
∑
t,t′
(I +G)−1(1, t)C(t, t′)(I +GT )−1(t′, 0)
= −G(1, 0) + C(1, 0) (62)
and
L(1, 1) =
∑
t,t′
(I +G)−1(1, t)C(t, t′)(I +GT )−1(t′, 1)
= G(1, 0)2 − 2C(1, 0)G(1, 0) + C(1, 0) (63)
From the above formulae we see that if the initial condi-
tion is large, in particular for y(0)≫ √α, we have
lim
ns→∞
C(1, 0) = 1 lim
ns→∞
G(1, 0) = 0 (64)
lim
ns→∞
L(1, 0) = 1 lim
ns→∞
L(1, 1) = 1 (65)
for 0 < λ < 1, and
lim
ns→∞
C(1, 0) = 0 lim
ns→∞
G(1, 0) = 0 (66)
lim
ns→∞
L(1, 0) = 0 lim
ns→∞
L(1, 1) = 1 (67)
for λ > 1, provided np is finite. The latter limits indicate
that, as is to be expected, for λ > 1 the agent de-activates
immediately after the first time step and starts being ac-
tive and inactive alternatively. The former limits imply
instead that the effective agent continues to play. In par-
ticular, as long as he’s playing, he’s insensitive to small
perturbations, so that
y(t) ≃ (1− λ)y(0) + t√αz(0) (68)
Hence one sees that the de-freezing occurs for times of
the order of (1− λ)/√α.
In order to obtain a deeper insight on the station-
ary states of (33), we now turn to a different approach,
namely the Eissfeller-Opper method. In a nutshell, the
idea is to simulate many copies of the effective dynamics
and calculate relevant physical observables as averages
over the whole population. The core of the procedure
lies in the possibility of evaluating the response function
without actually adding an external probing field. In
fact, for G(t, t′), which is formally given by 〈 ∂n(t)∂h(t′) 〉, one
can again resort to the noise and write
G(t, t′) =
1√
α
〈 ∂n(t)
∂z(t′)
〉
=
1√
α
∫
∂n(t)
∂z(t′)
P (z)Dz (69)
Now the noise distribution P (z) is
P (z) ∼ exp
−1
2
∑
t,t′
z(t)L−1(t, t′)z(t′)
 (70)
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FIG. 11: GCMG with different values of λ: numerical solution
of the effective dynamics for M = 250000 copies with ǫ =
−0.1. Markers correspond to the volatility as a function of
time for ns = 0.1 (circles), 1 (squares), 2 (diamonds), 4 (up
triangles), 8 (down triangles). Only a few markers are shown
for simplicity.
so that, after an integration by parts, one gets
G(t, t′) =
t−1∑
t′′=0
〈n(t)z(t′′)〉L−1(t′′, t′)
≡
t−1∑
t′′=0
K(t, t′′)L−1(t′′, t′) (71)
The matrix K, as well as the correlation function C, can
be evaluated by an average over the copies (say, M) of
the effective dynamics:
K(t, t′) =
1
M
M∑
ℓ=1
nℓ(t)zℓ(t
′) (72)
C(t, t′) =
1
M
M∑
ℓ=1
nℓ(t)nℓ(t
′) (73)
and the only remaining problem is that of generating
a noise z(t) having the desired statistical properties.
This can be done by properly summing and re-scaling
unit Gaussian variables. We focused again on the time-
evolution of the quantity L(t, t), whose limit t → ∞ is
linked to the volatility (see (55)). Results for different
λ’s and ns at np = 1 are shown in Fig. (11). One sees
that finite memory generally increases fluctuations. The
effect is more pronounced for large values of ns.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
To summarzie, we have studied the effects induced by
a finite score memory in MG-based market models. Our
main result is that finite score memory does not destroy
market-like phenomenology in grand canonical minority
11
games, and remedies two embarassing problems of minor-
ity games with a fixed set of strategies. From this point
of view, implementing finite scores is a useful extension
of GCMG, but cannot be understood fully by current
analytical methods.
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APPENDIX A: ORIGINAL MG WITH λ > 0.
The definition of the original MG is similar to that of
the GCMG, except that all the agents have at least two
strategies, and one score per strategy. Assuming that
they have only two strategies, denoted ai,1 and ai,2 for
agent i, each having their respective score yi,1 and yi,2.
0 100000 200000
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FIG. 12: The same realization of the standard minority game
with unbiased initial strategy scores and λ = 0 (circles), bi-
ased initial scores and λ = 0 (squares), biased initial scores
and λ = 0.1 (triangles). (P = 100, α = 0.1)
The latter evolve according to
yi,s(t+ 1) = yi(t)(1 − λ/P )− aµ(t)i,s A(t) (A1)
for the on-line MG, and
yi,s(t+ 1) = yi(t)(1 − λ)− aµ(t)i,s A(t) (A2)
for the batch MG. At each time step, the agents use
their strategy that has the highest score. The original
MG was defined with λ = 0, and the usual control pa-
rameter is α = P/N . There is a phase transition at
αc = 0.3374 . . . that separates an asymmetric, informa-
tion rich phase with H > 0 (α > αc) from a symmetric
phase with H = 0 (α < αc). In the latter, the stationary
state depends on the asymmetry
U0 = Ui,1(0)− Ui,2(0)
of the initial conditions. This dependence is due to the
fact that, if λ = 0,, all market fluctuations since time t =
0 are remembered and contribute with the same weight
to Ui,s(t), irrespective of how far in the past they took
place.
Fig. 12 shows that a time dependent σ2 = 〈A2〉t (here,
〈. . .〉t stands for an average over a long but finite time
interval around t). converges, for long times, to a value
12
0.1 1 10
α
0.1
1
10
σ
2 /Ν
lambda=0.0, initbias=0
lambda=0.1, initbias=0
lambda=0.2, initbias=0
lambda=0.2, initbias=10
lambda=0.2, initbias=20
FIG. 13: Average volatility σ2/N = 〈A2〉/N versus α = P/N
of the standard MG with unbiased initial scores and λ = 0
(circles), λ = 0.1 (squares), λ = 0.2 (diamonds), with biased
initial scores and λ = 0.2 (triangles).
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FIG. 14: σ2/N (black lines) and H/N (red lines) for a real-
ization of the standard Minority Game with increasing λ
which is independent of initial conditions U0. This im-
plies that the initial asymmetry U0 has no influence any
more on the stationary state.
This is confirmed by Fig. 13, where we plot σ2/N
as a function of α for various U0 and λ. For a fixed
α and for a given realization of the game, σ2 and H
are increasing functions of λ, although in the symmetric
phase (α < αc = 0.3374 . . . ) σ
2 varies very slowly with λ
(see Fig. 14). While only small values of λ make physical
sense, for completeness the same figure reports also the
strange effects of very large λ. From (A1), λ = P cancels
the contribution of Ui(t) in Ui(t+1); larger λ implies that
this contribution is of opposite sign to the usual MG.
